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25
Academic understanding of conformity, differentiation and change in organizational fields has 26 been advanced in recent years by a burgeoning literature drawing on the concept of institutional 27 logics. From its foundations in neo-institutionalism, the institutional logics perspective has 28 rapidly advanced to theorize how diverse institutional forces not only compete for dominance, 29 but also frequently interact and co-exist, and how this affects organizational and individual 30 behaviour. It offers a rich explanatory framework that accounts for heterogeneity as well as 31 conformity, and which better allows for the potential of agency as well as structure in enacting, 32 contesting and transforming institutions.
33
Within this approach, a particularly vibrant thread of research has focused on the 34 consequences of institutional complexity-that is, the presence of multiple logics with 35 conflicting, or at least diverging, prescriptions for behaviour. At the macro level, theoretical 36 and empirical studies have, as a rule, found that institutional complexity adds further (Smets et al. 2015) .
166
Taken together, these studies provide an important corrective to neo-institutionalism's 167 focus on the power of institutional logics. Yet their key methodological advantage-detailed 168 examination of practice as it takes place in real-life environments-also creates a limitation.
169
With few exceptions, these papers offer in-depth understanding of single organizations or even 170 single organizational sub-units, rather than cross-sectional comparisons. This means that they 171 are unlikely to reveal organizational-level contingencies in the way that, for example, a 172 comparative case-study approach might. They also tend to ascribe a remarkable degree of focus is the consequences for the composition of the field, ours is the consequences for the 193 autonomy of everyday actors (not muscular institutional entrepreneurs) at the coalface.
194
Whereas the success of institutional entrepreneurs is often attributed to the power deriving from including just four of the 11 we studied (see Table 1 ). The challenges inherent in sustaining the data from the seven discontinued services to consider them in detail in this paper, Table 1 297 shows how they resemble and differ from our sample of four according to key variables, and range of issues, most notably for this paper the rationale for the service, how it related to and 347 modified existing provision, relationships with key stakeholders and organizations, plans for 348 the future, and (at T2) progress towards maintaining provision post-pilot. In the follow-up study 349 our topic guide focused more specifically on the trials and tribulations of sustaining these small 350 service innovations in a changing environment, the degree to which they had evolved in their 351 service models, and the organizational, financial and relational work that had been done and 352 was anticipated to maintain their existence.
353
All interviews were transcribed in full. They were analysed using an approach informed There was a tangible shift in the language of those in decision-making positions in all four cases, towards an acknowledgement of the need for parsimony and demonstrable value.
424
Professionally led services, in the view of these stakeholders, needed to address changing 425 expectations around, for example, consumer-responsiveness in a competitive environment that 426 mirrored the market logic:
427
"The mistake I've seen a lot of services make is that they try really, really hard to 428 establish because they think there's a need to convince people, there's a need to get 
440
The outcomes: domination; resistance; transformation 441 Focal actors in all four cases worked hard to defend the services they had built, and secure 442 continued funding for them in this changing environment, while ensuring they remained true 443 to the professional logic on which the services had been founded. As noted above, all four Further work undertaken by the focal actor to resurrect her service following termination of 471 funding was unsuccessful, and by the end of the study period she was resigned to the fact that 472 "it's just gone back to how it was. The website is the only lasting legacy" (T4). successful in defending the professional logic in the changing field, such that their services 475 remained in place, largely unaffected by the wider environment and the rise of the market logic 476 for the duration of the period studied. As the focal actor in Dovington put it, with some surprise,
477
"actually to move us into the whole commissioning process and to make it sustainable was a 478 far more fraught process potentially than it actually was" (T3). The model of service delivery experience and outcome with all of that. We're always going to be able to be criticized 484 on the basis that we're providing a luxury service as opposed to an economy service, 485 but they're a very vulnerable group of patients." (Clinical geneticist, T4)
486
Similarly, in Carsridge, ongoing funding was secured and the service remained faithful to the 487 original design, without any challenge to the professionally determined service model: "I don't 488 think there was ever any major problems: it just seemed to happen" (Genetic counsellor, T3).
489
Only minor changes were instigated, such as adjustment of the skill mix to enhance the In all four cases, hard evidence about the efficiency or effectiveness of the services was 559 in short supply (see Martin et al. 2012 ). Evidence of this nature was difficult for focal actors to 560 generate-partly because they had never devised their services with such a crudely economic 561 calculus in mind, but also because generating such evidence was difficult in genetics with its 562 long-term, not short-term, outcomes: "it's difficult to demonstrate their value or the amount of 563 money they're saving," as a manager in Carsridge acknowledged (T3). Explanations for the 564 divergent outcomes premised on a rationalistic understanding of organizational decision-565 making can therefore be discounted.
566
Yet while the services in Ashover, Carsridge and Dovington may have been no more 567 cost-effective than that in Bolbourne, we have seen that as far as key decision-makers were 568 concerned, they were more in keeping with how a service of this nature should look. Although 569 all services lacked a clear economic rationale that would offer a firm alignment with the 570 expectations of the market logic, this was more problematic for some than others. From our 571 data, a number of explanations for this might be invoked, with differing degrees of support. it expand" (T3), while in Bolbourne, the service's manager had "less direct involvement" in the 614 service, "although because there was not really anyone else to do it I did carry on to an extent" 615 (T3). Further, and more critically, the focal actors were exposed to a range of expectations 616 associated with the market logic that were foreign to them-and lacked the managerial support 617 necessary to coherently argue their case in response.
618
On the face of it, this challenge also applied to Carsridge and Dovington. However, here shifting strategic focus is not tenable). Logics' influence cannot always be reduced in this way.
733
What our findings suggest is how the tension between logics can be managed even where 734 structural differentiation, so prone to disintegration, is necessary. What appears crucial is the 1 It might be noted in passing that of the seven services included in the original evaluation which did not obtain post-pilot funding, three had organizational set-ups involving collaboration between two or more host organizations (see Table 1 ). This may have added complication to the relationship among logics and their carriers, accounting in part for their failure to secure post-pilot funding, though we do not have the data to sustain this argument. 
